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ABSTRACT
While game-theoretic models and algorithms have been developed
to combat illegal activities, such as poaching and over-fishing, in
green security domains, none of the existing work considers the
crucial aspect of community engagement: community members
are recruited by law enforcement as informants and can provide
valuable tips, e.g., the location of ongoing illegal activities, to assist
patrols. We fill this gap and (i) introduce a novel two-stage security
game model for community engagement, with a bipartite graph
representing the informant-attacker social network and a level-κ
response model for attackers inspired by cognitive hierarchy; (ii)
provide complexity results and exact, approximate, and heuristic
algorithms for selecting informants and allocating patrollers against
level-κ (κ < ∞) attackers; (iii) provide a novel algorithm to find
the optimal defender strategy against level-∞ attackers, which
converts the problem of optimizing a parameterized fixed-point
to a bi-level optimization problem, where the inner level is just
a linear program, and the outer level has only a linear number
of variables and a single linear constraint. We also evaluate the
algorithms through extensive experiments.
KEYWORDS
Security Game; Computational Sustainability; Community Engage-
ment
1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the significance of protecting natural resources to envi-
ronmental sustainability, a common lack of funding leads to an
extremely low density of law enforcement units (referred to as
defenders) to combat illegal activities such as wildlife poaching and
overfishing (referred to as attacks). Due to insufficient sanctions,
attackers are able to launch frequent attacks [8, 9], making it even
more challenging to effectively detect and deter criminal activities
through patrolling. To improve patrol efficiency, law enforcement
agencies often recruit informants from local communities and plan
defensive resources based on tips provided by them [10]. Since
attackers are often from the same local community and their ac-
tivities can be observed by informants through social interactions,
such tips contain detailed information about ongoing or upcom-
ing criminal activities and, if known by defenders, can directly be
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used to guide allocating defensive resources. In fact, community
engagement is listed by World Wild Fund for Nature as one of the
six pillars towards zero poaching [25]. The importance of commu-
nity engagement goes beyond these green security domains about
environment conservation and extends to domains such as fighting
urban crimes [4, 22].
Previous research in computational game theory have led to
models and algorithms that can help the defenders allocate lim-
ited resources in the presence of attackers, with applications to
enforce traffic [17], combat oil-siphoning [23], and deceive cyber
adversaries [18] in addition to protecting critical infrastructure [16]
and combating wildlife crime [3]. However, none of the work has
considered this essential element of community engagement.
Community engagement leads to fundamentally new challenges
that do not exist in previous literature. First, the defender not only
needs to determine how to patrol but also needs to decide whom to
recruit as informants. Second, there can be multiple attackers, and
the existence of informants makes the success or failure of their
attacks interdependent since any tip about other attackers’ actions
can change the defender’s patrol. Third, because of the combinato-
rial nature of the tips, representing the defender’s strategy requires
exponential space, making the problem of finding optimal defender
strategy extremely challenging. Fourth, attackers may notice the
patrol pattern over time and adapt their strategies accordingly.
In this paper, we provide the first study to fill the gap and provide
a novel two-stage security game model for community engagement
which represents the social network between potential informants
and attackers with a bipartite graph. In the first stage of the game,
the defender recruits a set of informants under a budget constraint,
and in the second stage, the defender chooses a set of targets to
protect based on tips from recruited informants. Inspired by the
quantal cognitive hierarchy model [24], we use a level-κ response
model for attackers, taking into account the fact that the attacker
can make iterative reasoning and the attacker’s strategy will impact
the actual marginal strategy of the defender.
Our second contribution includes complexity results and algo-
rithms for computing optimal defender strategy against level-κ
(κ < ∞) attackers. We show that the problem of selecting the op-
timal set of informants is NP-Hard. Further, based on sampling
techniques, we develop an approximation algorithm to compute
the optimal patrol strategy and a heuristic algorithm to find the
optimal set of informants to recruit. For an expository purpose, we
mainly describe the algorithms for level-0 attackers and provide
the extension to level-κ (0 < κ < ∞) attackers in the last section.
The third contribution is a novel algorithm to find the optimal
defender strategy against level-∞ attackers, which is an extremely
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challenging task: an attacker’s strategy may affect the defender’s
marginal strategy, which in turn affects the attackers’ strategies and
level-∞ attackers is defined through a fixed-point argument; as a re-
sult, the defender’s utility relies crucially on solving a parameterized
fixed-point problem. A naïve mathematical programming-based
formulation is prohibitively large to solve. We instead reduce the
program to a bi-level optimization problem, where both levels be-
come more tractable. In particular, the inner level optimization is
a linear program, and the outer level optimization is one with a
linear number of variables and a single linear constraint.
Finally, we conduct extensive experiments. We compare the run-
ning time and solution quality of different algorithms.We show that
our bi-level optimization algorithm achieves better performance
than the algorithm adapted from previous works. We also compare
level-0 attackers and the case with insider threat (i.e., the attacker
is aware of the informants), where we formulate the problem as a
mathematical program and solve it by adapting an algorithm from
previous works. We show that the defender suffers from utility loss
if the insider threat is not taken into consideration and the defender
still assumes a naïve attacker model (level-0).
2 RELATEDWORK AND BACKGROUND
Community engagement is studied in criminology. Duffy et al.
[2], Moreto [13], Smith and Humphreys [20] investigate the role
of community engagement in wildlife conservation. Gill et al. [4],
Linkie et al. [10] show the positive effects of community-oriented
strategies. However, they lack a mathematical model for strategic
defender-attacker interactions.
Recruitment of informants has also been proposed to study soci-
etal attitudes in relation to crimes using evolutionary game theory
models. Short et al. [19] formulate the problem of solving recruit-
ment strategies as an optimal control problem to account for limited
resources and budget. In contrast to their work, we emphasize the
synergy of community engagement and allocation of defensive
resources and aim to find the best strategy of recruiting informants
and allocating defensive resources.
In security domains, Stackelberg Security Game (SSG) has been
applied to a variety of security problems [21], with variants account-
ing for alarm systems, surveillance cameras, and drones that can
provide information in real time [1, 5, 11]. Unlike the sensors that
provide location-based information as studied in previous works,
the kind of tips the informants can provide depends on their social
connections, an essential feature about community engagement.
Other than the full rationality model, boundedly rational behav-
ioral models such as quantal response (QR) [12, 26] and subjective
utility quantal response [15] have been explored in the study of SSG.
Our model and solution approach are compatible with most exist-
ing behavioral models in the SSG literature, but for an expository
purpose, we only focus on the QR model.
3 MODEL
In this section, we introduce our novel two-stage green security
game with community engagement. The key addition is the con-
sideration of informants from local communities. They can be re-
cruited and trained by the defender to provide tips about ongoing
or upcoming attacks.
Following existing works on SSG [6, 7], we consider a game
with a set of targets T = [n] = {1, . . . ,n}. The defender has r units
of defensive resources and each can protect or cover one target
with no scheduling constraint. An attacker can choose a target to
attack. If target i is attacked, the defender (attacker) receives Rdi > 0
(Pai < 0) if it is covered, otherwise receives P
d
i < 0 (R
a
i > 0).
Informants recruited by the defender can provide tips regarding
the exact targets in ongoing or upcoming attacks but tip frequency
and usefulness may vary due to heterogeneity in the informants’
social connections. We model the interactions and connections be-
tween potential informants X (i.e., members of the community that
are known to be non-attacker and can be recruited by the defender)
and potential attackers Y using a bipartite graph GS = (X ,Y ,E)
with X ∩ Y = ∅. Here we assume the defender has access to a list
of potential attackers which could be provided by the conservation
site manager, since the deployment of our work relies on the man-
ager’s domain knowledge, experience, and understanding of the
social connections among community members.
When an attacker decides to launch an attack, an informant
who interacted with the attacker previously may know his target
location. Formally, for each v ∈ Y , we assume that v will attack
a target with probability pv but the target is unknown without
informants and each attacker takes actions independently. An edge
(u,v) ∈ E is associated with an information sharing intensitywuv ,
representing the probability of attack activities of attacker v being
reported by u, given v attacks and u is recruited as an informant.
In the first stage, the defender recruits k informants, and in the
second stage, the defender receives tips from the informants and
allocates r units of defensive resources. The defender’s goal is to
maximize the expected utility defined as the summation of the
utilities for each attack.
Let U denote the set of recruited informants in the first stage
where |U | ≤ k , and V = {v | ∃u ∈ V , (u,v) ∈ E} denote the
set of attackers that are connected with at least one informant in
U . We represent tips as a vector of disjoint subsets of attackers
V = (V1, . . . ,Vn ), where Vi is the set of attackers who are reported
to attack target i ∈ T such that Vi ⊆ V ,Vi ∩ Vj = ∅ for any
i, j ∈ T . An attacker v is reported if there exists i ∈ T such that
v ∈ Vi , otherwise he is unreported.We also denote byV0 = ⋃i ∈T Vi
the set of reported attackers. It is possible that V0 = ∅ and we
say the defender is informed if V0 , ∅. Note that V is a compact
representation of the tips received by the defender as it neglects the
identity of the informants, which is not crucial in the defender’s
decision making given that all the tips are assumed to be correct.
In practice, tips are infrequent and the defender is often very
protective of the informants. Thus, the attackers are often not aware
of the existence of informants unless there is a significant insider
threat. In addition, patrols can be divided into two categories –
routine patrols and ambush patrols, where the latter are in response
to tips from informants. Ambush patrols are costly, often requiring
rangers to lie in wait for many hours for the possibility of catching
a poacher. If not informed, the defender follows her routine patrol
strategy x0 = (x1, . . . ,xn ) with xi denoting the probability that
target i is covered. Naturally, under this assumption the defender
should use a strategy x0 that is optimal against the QRmodel, which
can be computed by following [26]. If informed she uses different
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strategies x(V) based on the tip V. Assume that each attacker, if
deciding to attack a target, will respond to the defender’s strategy
following a known behavioral model – the QR model. We define
QR(x′) := (q′1, . . . ,q′n ), where q′i is the probability of attacking
target i defined by
q′i =
eλ[x ′iPai +(1−x ′i )Rai ]∑
j ∈T e
λ
[
x ′jP
a
j +(1−x ′j )Raj
] , (1)
and x′ is the attacker’s subjective belief of the coverage probabilities.
In the above equation, λ ≥ 0 is the precision parameter [12] fixed
throughout the paper. We discuss the relaxation of the some of the
assumptions mentioned above in Section 8.
3.1 Level-κ Response Model
Motivated by the costly ambush patrols and inspired by the cog-
nitive hierarchy theory, we propose the level-κ response model as
the attackers’ behavior model.
When the informants’ report intensities are negligible, the attack-
ers are almost always faced with the routine patrol x0. But when the
informants’ report intensities are not negligible, the attackers’ be-
havior will change the marginal probability that a target is covered.
Thus we assume that level-0 attackers just play the quantal response
against the routine patrol x0: q0 = QR(x0). Then the defender will
likely get informed with different tips V, and respond with x(V)
accordingly. Over time, the attackers will learn about the change
in the frequency that a target is covered. We denote the induced
defender’s marginal strategy at level 0 by xˆ0 = MS(x0, x, q0). After
observing xˆ0 at level 0, level-1 attackers will update their strategies
from q0 to q1 = QR(xˆ0). Similarly, attackers at level κ (0 < κ < ∞)
will use quantal response against the defender’s marginal strategy
at level κ − 1, i.e., qκ = QR(xˆκ−1), where xˆκ−1 = MS(x0, x, qκ−1).
In Section 5, we also define level-∞ attackers.
Denote by DefEU(U ) the defender’s optimal utility when they
recruit a set of informantsU and use the optimal defending strategy.
The key questions raised given this model are (i) how to recruit a set
U of at most k informants and (ii) how to respond to the provided
tips to maximize the expected DefEU(U )?
4 DEFENDING AGAINST LEVEL-0
ATTACKERS
In this section, we first tackle the case where all attackers are level-0
by providing complexity results and algorithms to find the opti-
mal set of informants. Designing efficient algorithms to solve this
computationally hard problem is particularly challenging due to
the combinatorial nature of the tips and exponentially many possi-
bilities of informant selections. Furthermore, in the general case,
attackers are heterogeneous and we do not know which attackers
will be reported, making it hard to compute DefEU(U ).
4.1 Complexity Results
Let q0 = (q1, . . . ,qn ). Before presenting our complexity results, we
first define some useful notations. Given the set of informants U
and the tips V = (V1, . . . ,Vn ), we denote by p˜v (V0) the probability
of v ∈ Y attacking a target given V0 such that V0 = ⋃i ∈T Vi . We
can compute p˜v (V0) with
p˜v (V0) =

1 v ∈ V0
(1−w˜v )pv
(1−w˜v )pv+1−pv v ∈ V \V0
pv v ∈ Y \V
,
where w˜v = 1 −∏(u,v)∈E,u ∈U (1 − wuv ) is the probability of v
being reported given he attacks. Given V0 and ti = |Vi | reported
attacks on each target i , we compute the expected utility on i if
i is covered with EUci (ti ,V0) :=
(
ti + qi
∑
v ∈Y \V0 p˜v (V0)
)
Rdi . We
compute the expected utility if i is uncovered, EUui (ti ,V0), similarly.
Then, the expected gain of the target if covered can be written as
EGi (ti ,V0) := EUci (ti ,V0) − EUui (ti ,V0).
Theorem 4.1. When the defender is informed by informants U ,
the optimal allocation of defensive resources can be determined in
O(|Y | + n) time given the tips V = (V1, . . . ,Vn ).
Given tips from recruited informants, the defender can find the
optimal resource allocation by greedily protecting the targets with
the highest expected gains. The proof of Theorem 4.1 is deferred to
Appendix B. However, the problem of computing the optimal set of
informants is still hard.
Theorem 4.2. Computing the optimal set of informants to recruit
is NP-Hard.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 in Appendix C focuses on a relatively
simple case and constructs a reduction from the maximum coverage
problem (MCP).
4.2 Finding the Optimal Set of Informants
In this subsection, we develop exact and heuristic informant se-
lection algorithms to compute the optimal set of informants. To
find the U that maximizes DefEU(U ), we first focus on computing
DefEU(U ) by providing a dynamic programming-based algorithm
and approximate algorithms.
4.2.1 CalculatingDefEU(U ). LetDefEU0 be the expected utility
when using the optimal regular defending strategy against a single
attack, which can be obtained by the algorithms introduced in [26].
Then DefEU(U ) can be explicitly written as
DefEU(U ) = Pr[V0 = ∅]DefEU0
+ Pr[V0 , ∅]E

∑
i ∈[n]
xi (V )EGi (ti ,V0) + EUi (ti ,V0)
V0 , ∅ .
To directly compute DefEU(U ) from the above equation is formida-
ble due to the exponential number of tips combinations. However,
it is possible to reduce a significant amount of enumeration by
handling the calculation carefully. We first develop an Enumeration
and Dynamic Programming-based Algorithm (EDPA) to compute
the exact DefEU(U ) as shown in Algorithm 1.
First, we compute the utility when the defender is not informed
(lines 4-6). Then, we focus on calculating the total utilityDefEU′(U )
in the case when the defender is informed. By the linearity of
expectation, DefEU′(U ) can be computed as the summation of the
expected utility obtained from all targets. Therefore, we focus on
the calculation of the expected utility of a single target i . For each
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target i , Algorithm 1 enumerates all possible types of tips (lines
2-7). We denote each type of tip by a tuple (ti ,V0), which encodes
the set of reported attackers V0 , ∅ and the number of reported
attackers ti targeting location i . The probability of receiving (ti ,V0)
can be written as
Pr(ti ,V0 |U ) = PV0
( |V0 |
ti
)
qtii (1 − qi ) |V0 |−ti ,
where
PV0 =
∏
v ∈V0
(w˜vpv )
∏
v ∈V \V0
(1 − w˜vpv ) (2)
is the probability of having V0 being the set of reported attackers
givenU (line 3). Let Pi,r be the probability of i being among the r
targets with the highest expected gain given (ti ,V0) and U (lines
12-13). For a given tip type (ti ,V0), the expected contribution to
DefEU′(U ) of target i is
Pr(ti ,V0 |U ) · EUi (ti ,V0) + PV0
( |V0 |
ti
)
qtii · Pi,r EGi (ti ,V0)
= PV0
( |V0 |
ti
)
qtii
(
(1 − qi ) |V0 |−ti EUi (ti ,V0) + Pi,r EGi (ti ,V0)
)
.
We can then compute DefEU′(U ) by summing over all possible
ti ,V0 , ∅.
The calculation of Pi,r is all that remains. This can be done
very efficiently via Algorithm 2, a dynamic programming-based
calculation. Let {i1, . . . , in−1} denote the set of targets apart from
i , i.e., T \ {i} (line 1) and y! · f (s,x ,y) be the probability of having
y reported attacks among the first s targets with x of the targets
having expected gain higher than EGi given the tips of type (ti ,V0).
Therefore, f (s,x ,y) can be neatly written as
f (s,x ,y) =
∑
a1+· · ·+as=y,∑s
j=1 1[EGij (aj ,V0)>EGi (ti ,V0)]=x
qa1i1 q
a2
i2
· · ·qasis
a1!a2! · · ·as ! ,
which can be calculated using dynamic programming (line 5-11).
Computing f (s,x ,y) is done in a similar way by counting the num-
ber of s-partitions on integer y, where we also consider the con-
straint brought in by the limitation on the number of resources.
To calculate f (s,x ,y), we enumerate as as y˜ (line 6) and compare
EGis (as ,V0) with EGi (ti ,V0) (line 8). If EGis (as ,V0) > EGi (ti ,V0),
we check the value of f (s − 1,x − 1,y − y˜) (line 9), otherwise
check f (s − 1,x ,y − y˜) (line 11). Thus, we have Pi,r = (|V0 | −
ti )!
(∑r−1
x=0 f (s,x , |V0 | − ti )
)
. The time complexity for Algorithm 2
is O(nr |Y |2) and O(2 |Y |n2r |Y |3) for Algorithm 1.
Since EDPA runs in exponential time, we introduce approxima-
tion methods to estimate DefEU(U ). Let DefEU(U ,C) be the esti-
mated defender’s utility returned by Algorithm 1 if only subsets of
reported attackersV0 with |V0 | < C are enumerated in line 2. We de-
note by C-Truncated this approach of estimating DefEU(U ). Next,
we show that DefEU(U ,C) is close to the exact DefEU(U ) when
it is unlikely to have many attacks happening at the same time.
Formally, assume that the expected number of attacks is bounded
by a constant C ′, that is ∑v ∈Y pv ≤ C ′, DefEU(U ,C) for C > C ′ is
an estimation of DefEU(U ) with bounded error.
Algorithm 1 Calculate DefEU(U )
1: EU← 0
2: for all possible sets of reported attackers V0 ⊆ V do
3: PV0 ←
∏
v ∈V0 (w˜vpv )
∏
v ∈V \V0 (1 − w˜vpv )
4: if V0 = ∅ then
5: EU = EU + PV0
∑
v ∈Y p˜v (V0)DefEU0
6: Continue to line 2
7: for target i ∈ T and 0 ≤ ti ≤ |V0 | do
8: Calculate f (·) given |V0 |, i, ti
9: EGi ← (ti + qi ∑v ∈Y \V0 p˜v (V0))(Rdi − Pdi )
10: EUui ← (ti + qi
∑
v ∈Y \V0 p˜v (V0))Pdi
11: Pi,r ← (|V0 | − ti )!
(∑r−1
x=0 f (s,x , |V0 | − ti )
)
12: EU = EU + PV0
( |V0 |
ti
)
qtii · Pi,r · EGi
13: EU = EU + PV0
( |V0 |
ti
)
qtii (1 − qtii )EUui
14: DefEU(U ) ← EU
Algorithm 2 Calculate f (·) given |V0 |, i, ti
1: {i1, . . . , in−1} ← T \ {i}
2: EGi ← (ti + qi ∑v ∈Y \V0 p˜v (V0))(Rdi − Pdi )
3: Initialize f (s,x ,y) ← 0 for all s,x ,y
4: f (0, 0, 0) ← 1
5: for s in [1,n − 1], x in [0,min(s, r )], y in [0, |V0 | − ti ] do
6: for y˜ in [0,y] do
7: EGis ← (y˜ + qis
∑
v ∈Y \V0 p˜v (V0))(Rdis − Pdis )
8: if EGis > EGi then
9: f (s,x ,y) += q
y˜
is
y˜! f (s − 1,x − 1,y − y˜)
10: else
11: f (s,x ,y) += q
y˜
is
y˜! f (s − 1,x ,y − y˜)
Lemma 4.3. Assume that
∑
v ∈Y pv ≤ C ′ and |Pdi |, |Rdi | ≤ Q , the
error of estimation |DefEU(U ,C) −DefEU(U )| forC > C ′ is at most:
Q · e−2(C−C ′)2/ |Y |
(
C +
1
1 − e−4(C−C ′)/ |Y |
)
.
The proof of Lemma 4.3 is deferred to Appendix G. The time
complexity of C-Truncated is given by O(n2r |Y |C+3).
However, for the case where
∑
v ∈Y pv is large, we have to set C
to be larger than
∑
v ∈Y pv for C-Truncated in order to obtain a
high-quality solution; otherwise the error will become unbounded.
To mitigate this limitation, we also propose an alternative sampling
approach, T-Sampling, to estimate DefEU(U ) for general cases
without restrictions on
∑
pv . Instead of enumerating all possibleV0
as EDPA does, in T-Sampling, we draw T i.i.d. samples of the set of
reported attackers where each sample V0 is drawn with probability
PV0 . T-Sampling takes the average of the expected defender’s utility
when having V0 as the reported attackers over all samples as the
estimation ofDefEU(U ). We can sampleV0 as follows: (i) LetV0 = ∅
initially; (ii) For each v ∈ V , add v to V0 with probability w˜vpv ;
(iii) Return V0 as a sample of the set of reported attackers. From
Equation (2), the above sampling process is consistent with the
distribution of V0. T-Sampling returns an estimation of DefEU(U )
in O(Tn2r |Y |3) time.
Green Security Game with Community Engagement AAMAS’20, May 2020, Auckland, New Zealand
Proposition 4.4. LetDefEU(T)(U ) be the estimation ofDefEU(U )
given byT-Sampling using T samples.We have: limT→∞ DefEU(T)(U ) =
DefEU(U )
4.2.2 Selecting Informants U . Given the algorithms for comput-
ing DefEU(U ), a straightforward way of selecting informants is
through enumeration (denoted as Select).
When usingC-Truncated as a subroutine to computeDefEU(U ),
the solution quality of the selected set of informants is guaranteed
by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. Assume that
∑
v ∈Y pv ≤ C ′ and |Pdi |, |Rdi | ≤ Q .
Let UOPT and U ′ be the optimal set of informants and the one cho-
sen by C-Truncated. Then for C > C ′, the error |DefEU(UOPT) −
DefEU(U ′)| can be bounded by:
2Q · e−2(C−C ′)2/ |Y |
(
C +
1
1 − e−4(C−C ′)/ |Y |
)
.
Proposition 4.6. Using T-Sampling to estimate DefEU, the opti-
mal set of informants can be found when T→∞.
Algorithm 3 Search(U ′)
1: if |U ′ | = k then
2: Update OPT with (U ′,DefEU(U ′))
3: return
4: u1 ← arg maxu ∈X DefEU(U ′ ∪ {u})
5: u2 ← arg maxu ∈X \{u1 } DefEU(U ′ ∪ {u})
6: Search(U ′ ∪ {u1}), Search(U ′ ∪ {u2})
Based on existing results in submodular optimization [14], one
may expect a greedy algorithm that step by step adds an infor-
mant that leads to the largest utility to work well. However, the
set function DefEU(U ) in our problem violates submodularity (see
Appendix F) and such greedy algorithm will not guarantee an ap-
proximation ratio of 1 − 1/e . Therefore, we propose GSA (Greedy-
based Search Algorithm) for the selection of informants as shown
in Algorithm 3. GSA starts by calling Search(∅). While |U ′ | < k ,
Search(U ′) expands the current set of informants U ′ by adding
u1,u2 toU ′ and recursing, where u1 and u2 are the two informants
that give the largest marginal gain in DefEU (line 4-5); Otherwise,
it updates the optimal solution withU ′ (line 1-3).
We identify a tractable case to conclude the section.
Lemma 4.7. Given the set of recruited informantsU , the defender’s
expected utility DefEU(U ) can be computed in polynomial time if
wuv = 1∀(u,v) ∈ E. When k is a constant, the optimal set of infor-
mants can be computed in polynomial time.
This represents the case where the informants have strong con-
nections with a particular group of attackers and can get full access
to their attack plans. We refer to the property of wuv = 1 for all
u,v as SISI (Strong Information Sharing Intensity). Denote by ASISI
(Algorithm for SISI) the polynomial-time algorithm in Lemma 4.7.
We provide more details about the SISI case in Appendix D and E.
We summarize the time complexity of all algorithms for comput-
ing the optimalU in Table 1 in the Appendix.
5 DEFENDING AGAINST LEVEL-∞
ATTACKERS
As discussed in Section 3.1, a level-κ attacker may keep adapting to
the new marginal strategy formed by his current level of behavior.
In this section, we first show in Theorem 5.1 that there exists a
fixed-point strategy for the attacker in our level-κ response model,
and then use that to define the level-∞ attackers.
We formulate the problem of finding the optimal defender’s
strategy for this case as a mathematical program. However, such a
program can be too large to solve. We propose a novel technique
that reduces the program to a bi-level optimization problem, with
both levels much more tractable.
Theorem 5.1. Let ∆n = {q | q ∈ [0, 1]n , 1Tq ≤ 1}. Given
defender’s strategies x0 and x(V), there exists q∗ ∈ ∆n such that
q∗ = QR(MS(x0, x, q∗)).
Proof. Since ∆n is a compact convex set and QR(MS(x0, x, q∗))
is a continuous function of q, by Brouwer fixed-point theorem,
there exists q∗ ∈ ∆n such that q∗ = QR(MS(x0, x, q∗)). □
According to the definition of level-κ attackers, we have qκ+1 =
QR(MS(x0, x, qκ )). Slightly generalizing the definition, we define a
level-∞ attacker as:
Definition 5.2 (level-∞ attacker). Given the defender’s strate-
gies x0 and x(V), the strategy q of a level-∞ attacker satisfies
q = QR(MS(x0, x, q)).
Remark 5.3. Note that Definition 5.2 is not obtained by taking the
limit of the level-κ definition, since such a limit may not even exist
(see Example H.1 in Appendix H).
Remark 5.4. Although the level-∞ attacker is defined through a
fixed point argument, we still stick to the Stackelberg assumption: the
defender leads and the attacker follows. Notice that in the equation q =
QR(MS(x0, x, q)), qwill only be defined after the defender commits to
strategies x0 and x. However, it is different from the standard Strong
Stackelberg Equilibrium [7] in that the attacker is following a level-∞
response model, as defined by the fixed point equation.
Also, as we will discuss in Section 7.1.3 on our experiments, when
r = n, the defender’s optimal strategy is not to use up all the available
resources. This is clearly different from a Nash equilibrium, as the
defender still has incentives to use more resources.
5.1 Convergence Condition for the Level-κ
Response Model
We focus on the single-attacker case, where there are only n differ-
ent types of tips. We use Vi to denote the tips where the attacker is
reported to attack target i . When the attacker is using strategy q,
the probability of receiving Vi is Pr{Vi } = wqi .
Theorem 5.5. Let x¯i = maxj {xi (Vj )}. In the single attacker case,
if there exists constant L ∈ [0, 1), such that x¯i ≤ Lnλ(Rai −Pai ) ,∀i , then
level-κ agents converge to level-∞ agents as κ approaches infinity.
The proof of Theorem 5.5 is omitted since it is immediate from
the following lemma:
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Lemma 5.6. In the single attacker case, if there exists constant
L ∈ [0, 1), such that x¯i ≤ Lnλ(Rai −Pai ) for all i , then д(q) is L-Lipschitz
with respect to the L1-norm, i.e., д(q) is a contraction.
The proof of Lemma 5.6 is deferred to Appendix I.
Corollary 5.7. In the single attacker case, if there exists a constant
L ∈ [0, 1), such that Lnλ(Rai −Pai ) > 1,∀i , then level-κ agents converge
to level-∞ agents as κ goes to infinity.
5.2 A Bi-Level Optimization for Solving the
Optimal Defender’s Strategy
In this section, we still consider the single attacker case and assume
the defender has r ≥ 1 resources. Clearly, the optimal set of infor-
mants should contain the ones with the highest information sharing
intensities. It remains to compute the optimal strategies x0 and x(V).
Given the optimal set of informantsU ∗, the probability of receiving
a tip is w = 1 −∏u ∈U ∗ (1 −wu1). Let Pr{V} be the probability of
receiving tips V, which depends q. Let x(V) = (x1(V), . . . ,xn (V))
be the defender strategy when receiving tips V.
Let q = (q1, . . . ,qn ) be the strategy of the level-∞ attacker. Given
V and the corresponding ti ’s, the expected number of attackers that
are going to attack target i is di = ti + (1−∑j tj )p˜v (∅)qi . Therefore,
given xˆ we have the defender’s expected utility DefEU(x0, x) as
DefEU(x0, x) = ∑V,i Pr{V}di [Pdi + xi (V) (Rdi − Pdi )] .
Then the problem of finding the optimal defender strategy can be
formulated as the following mathematical program:
max DefEU(x0, x) s.t. q = QR(MS(x0, x, q)).
In the single-attacker case, we need n and n2 variables to represent
x0 and x. We can use the QRI-MILP algorithm1 to find the solution.
However, this approach needs to solve a mixed integer program
and does not scale well.
To tackle the problem, we focus on the defender’s marginal
strategy instead of the full strategy representation, and decompose
the above program into a bi-level optimization problem.
Let xˆ = MS(x0, x, q) = ∑V Pr{V}x(V), where we slightly abuse
notation and use V = ∅ to denote the case of receiving no tip, x(∅)
to denote x0. The bi-level optimization method works as follows.
At the inner level, we fix an arbitrary feasible xˆ, and solve the
following mathematical program:
max DefEU(xˆ)
s.t.
∑
V Pr{V}x(V) = xˆ, q = QR(xˆ)
1Tx(V) ≤ r , x(V) ∈ [0, 1]n ,∀V
Since xˆ is fixed, q and Pr{V} are also fixed. Thus, the program above
becomes a linear program, with x(V) as variables. We can always
find a feasible solution to it by simply setting x(V) = xˆ,∀V. Solving
this linear program gives us the optimal defender’s utilityDefEU(xˆ)
for any possible xˆ. To find the optimal defender strategy, we solve
the outer-level optimization problem below:
max DefEU(xˆ) s.t. xˆ is feasible.
1An algorithm that computes an approximate defender’s optimal strategy against a
variant of level-0 attackers who take into account the impact of informants when
determining the target they attack. See Appendix J for more details.
Since the feasible region of xˆ is continuous, we can use any known
algorithm (e.g., gradient descent) to solve the outer-level program.
The inner-level linear program still suffers from the scalability
problem. However, when there are multiple attackers, the optimal
objective value can be well-approximated by simply sampling a
subset of possible V’s, or focusing only on the V’s with the highest
probabilities. For those V’s that are not considered, we can always
use x0 as the default strategy for x(V).
6 DEFENDING AGAINST
INFORMANT-AWARE ATTACKERS
We now consider a variant of our model where attackers take into
account the impact of informants when determining the target they
attack. Specifically, we assume the attackers follow the QR behavior
model but incorporate the probability of being discovered when
determining their expected utility for attacking a target.2 In this
setting, the attackers’ subjective belief x′ of the target coverage
probability does not necessarily satisfy
∑
i x
′
i ≤ r . Consider the
example of a single attacker and a single informant with report
intensity 1. Assume that the defender has r = 1 and always protects
the target being reported with probability 1. Then no matter which
target the attacker chooses to attack, it will always be covered.
We focus on the single attacker case with r ≥ 1. We first consider
the problem of computing the optimal defender strategywhen given
the set of informantsU and associated probability of receiving a tip
w = 1−∏u ∈U (1−wu1). In the general case with multiple attackers,
we will need to specify the defender strategy for each combination
of tips received. However, when there is only one attacker, we can
succinctly describe the defender strategy by their default strategy
without tips, x, and their probability of defending a location after
receiving a tip for that location, z. Then, under the QR adversary
model, the probability qi of the attacker targeting location i will be:
qi =
eλ{[(1−w )xi+wzi ]Pai +[1−(1−w )xi−wzi ]Rai }∑
j ∈T e
λ
{
[(1−w )x j+wzj ]Paj +[1−(1−w )x j−wzj ]Raj
} .
This leads to the following optimization problem, QRI, to com-
pute the optimal defender strategy:
max
x,y,a
∑
i ∈T eλR
a
i e−λ(Rai −Pai )yi
[
(Rdi − Pdi )yi + Pdi
]
∑
i ∈T eλR
a
i e−λ(Rai −PAi )yi
subject to yi = (1 −w)xi +wzi , ∀i ∈ T (3)∑
i ∈T xi ≤ r (4)
0 ≤ xi , zi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ T (5)
We can compute the optimal defender strategy by adapting the
approach used in the PASAQ algorithm [26]. The description of the
algorithm is deferred to Appendix J.
7 EXPERIMENT
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
algorithms through extensive experiments. In our experiments, all
2Consider attackers that have had experience playing against the defender. Over time,
the attacker might start to consider their expected utility in practice, which is affected
by informants.
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reported results are averaged over 30 randomly generated game in-
stances. See Appendix L for details about generating game instances
and parameters. Unless specified otherwise, all game instances are
generated in this way.
7.1 Experimental Results
We compare the scalability and the solution quality of Select using
EDPA, C-Truncated, T-Sampling to obtain DefEU and GSA for
different settings of the problems against level-0 attackers.
First, we test the case where
∑
v ∈Y pv < 3. We set |X | = 6,k =
4,n = 8, r = 3 and enumerate |Y | from 2 to 16. The results are
shown in Figure 1a. We also include Greedy as a baseline that
always chooses the informants that maximizes the probability of
receiving tips. We can see that T-Sampling performs the best in
term of runtime, but fails to provide high-quality solutions. While
C-Truncated is slower than T-Sampling, it performs the best with
no error on all test cases. However, when there is no restriction
on
∑
v ∈Y pv , as shown in Figure 1b, C-Truncated performs badly,
even worse than Greedy for large |Y |, while T-Sampling performs
a lot better and GSA performs the best. We also fix |X | = 7, |Y | =
10,k = 3, r = 5 and change the number of targets n from 5 to 25 for∑
v ∈Y pv < 3. The results are shown in Figure 1c. GSA is the fastest
but provides slightly worse solutions than C-Truncated does. The
runtime of Greedy is less than 0.3s for all instances tested.
We then perform a case study to show the trade-off between the
optimal number of resources to allocate and the optimal number
of informants to recruit with budget constraints when defending
against level-0 attackers. We set |X | = |Y | = n = 6 and generate an
instance of the game. We set the cost of allocating one defensive
resourceCr = 3 and the cost of hiring one informantCi = 1. Given
a budget B, we can recruit k informants and allocate r resources
when k ·Ci + r ·Cr ≤ B. The trade-off between the optimal k and r
is shown in Figure 1d. In the same instance, we study how the de-
fender’s utility would change by increasing the number of recruited
informants with fixed r . Given a fixed number of resources, the
defender should recruit as many informants as possible. We can also
see that assuming the defender can acquire sufficient resources, the
importance of recruiting additional informants is diminished. This
result provides useful guidance to defenders such as conservation
agencies in allocating their budget and recruiting informants.
We run additional experiments for the SISI case and do a case
study to show the errors of the estimations for all U ⊆ X on 2
instances. We present the results in Appendix K.
7.1.1 Level-0 vs. Level-∞ attackers. We set |X | = n = 6, |Y | =
p1 = 1, and GS to be fully connected. We set r = 2, 4, 6 and vary k
from 1 . . . 6. We first fix the defender’s strategy to the one against
level-0 attackers and compare the utility achieved by the defender
when defending against a level-0 attacker and a level-∞ attacker.We
show how the defender utility varies with the number of informants
and defensive resources in Figure 1e. On average, we see that the
defender utility against a level-∞ attacker is lower than that against
a level-0 attacker. We also show the utility of the defender using
her optimal strategy against a level-∞ attacker. We can see that
when facing a level-∞ attacker, the defender utility when using the
optimal strategy is higher by a margin than using the one against
level-0 attackers.
7.1.2 Level-0 vs. informant-aware defenders. We set |X | = n = 6,
|Y | = p1 = 1, andGS to be fully connected. We vary r from 1 . . . 6
and k from 0 . . . 6. We assume that the defender recruits the k infor-
mants with the highest information sharing intensitywu1. The op-
timal defender strategy against the informant-aware attacker case
is found using QRI-MILP. The defender strategy against the level-0
attacker case is computed using PASAQ [26]. The defender utility
against the level-0 attacker is found by first computing qi ,DefEU0
and then using the results to compute DefEU(U ).
In Figure 1g, we show how the defender utility in the two cases
varies with the number of informants and defensive resources.
On average, we see that the defender utility is marginally higher
against the level-0 attacker than against the informant-aware at-
tacker, particularly when the defender has either very few or very
many defensive resources. We also compare the defender’s utility
of the level-0 defender (defending against level-0 attackers) and
the informant-aware defender (defending against informant-aware
attackers). The results are deferred to Appendix K.
7.1.3 Comparison between the Bi-Level Algorithm and QRI-MILP.
We empirically compare the bi-level optimization algorithm with
QRI-MILP. We set |X | = n = 6, |Y | = p1 = 1, and GS to be fully
connected. We vary r from 1 . . . 6 and k from 0 . . . 6.
In both cases, we assume that the defender recruits the k in-
formants with the highest information sharing intensitywu1. The
results are shown in Figure 1f. In general, our bi-level algorithm
gives higher expected defender utilities than the QRI-MILP algo-
rithm, except when r = 1. Our results show that both increasing the
number of resources and hiring more informants increase the de-
fender’s utility. However, as the number of resources (r ) increases,
the utility gain from hiring more informants diminishes.
Intuitively, if the number of resources equals the number of tar-
gets, the defender should always cover all the targets, Interestingly,
during our experiments, we observed that in this case, the optimal
defender strategy may not always use all his resources to cover
all the targets. The reason is that in a general sum game, by de-
creasing the probability of protecting a certain target on purpose,
the defender can lure the attacker into attacking the target more
frequently, and thus increase his expected utility. Such strategies
can be found in real-world wildlife protections where the patrollers
may sometimes deliberately ignore the tips. This is also reflected in
our bi-level algorithm. If the defender always uses all his resources,
then both the defender’s and the attacker’s strategies are fixed, and
hiring more informants does not increase the defender’s expected
utility. But if the defender strategy does not always use all his re-
sources, then hiring more informants could help (see the bi-level
algorithm for the r = 6 case in Figure 1f).
8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a novel two-stage security game model
and a multi-level QR behavioral model that incorporated commu-
nity engagement. We provided complexity results, developed algo-
rithms to find (sub-)optimal groups of informants to recruit against
level-0 attackers and evaluated the algorithms through extensive
experiments. Our results also generalize to the case where infor-
mants have heterogeneous recruitment costs and to different kinds
of attacker response models, such as SUQR model [15], which can
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(a) Runtime and solution quality increasing |Y | with ∑pv < 3. (b) Runtime and solution quality increasing |Y | for General Cases.
(c) Runtime and solution quality increasing n with
∑
pv < 3.
(d) Trade-off between r and k, and increase of utility with fixed r
( |X | = 6, |Y | = 6, n = 6).
(e) Comparison between the defender util-
ity against level-0 and level-∞ attackers.
“L-∞/0 def” means that the defender uses
the optimal strategy against a Level-∞/0 at-
tacker.
(f) Comparison between the bi-level optimization
algorithm and QRI-MILP.
(g) Comparison between defender utility
against level-0 and informant-aware at-
tackers.
Figure 1: Experimental Results.
be done by calculating the attacker’s response correspondingly.
Also, see Appendix M on how to extend our algorithms to defend
against level-κ (κ < ∞) attackers. In Section 5, we defined a more
powerful type of attacker that could respond to the marginal strat-
egy and developed a bi-level optimization algorithm to find the
optimal defender’s strategy in this case.
In the anti-poaching domain, some conservation site managers
utilize the so-called “intelligence” operations that rely on infor-
mants in nearby villages to alert rangers when they know the
poachers’ plans in advance. The deployment of the work relies on
the site manager to provide their understanding of the social con-
nections among community members. The edges and parameters
of the bipartite graph in our model can be extracted from a local so-
cial media application or historical data collected by site managers.
Recruiting and training reliable informants is costly and managers
may only afford a limited number of them. Our model and solution
can help the managers efficiently recruit informants, make the best
use of tips and evaluate the trade-off between allocating budget to
hiring rangers and recruiting informants in a timely fashion.
For future work, instead of using a particular behavior model, we
can use historical records as training data and learn the attackers’
behavior in different domains. It would also be interesting to con-
sider the case where the informants can only provide inaccurate tips
or other types of tips, e.g., some subset of targets will be attacked
instead of a single location. We can also model the informants as
strategic agents. In real life, it is possible that informants may also
provide fake information if they have their own utility structures.
We can try to reward them to elicit true information and maximize
the defender’s utility.
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APPENDIX:
GREEN SECURITY GAMEWITH
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
A COMPLEXITY OF DIFFERENT
ALGORITHMS
Algorithm Time Complexity
EDPA O(|X |k2 |Y |n2r |Y |3)
C-Truncated O(|X |kn2r |Y |C+3)
T-Sampling O(|X |kTn2r |Y |3)
ASISI O(|X |kn2r |Y |4)
GSA O(2k |X |n2r |Y |3)
Table 1: Complexity Table
B PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Theorem 4.1. When the defender is informed by informants U ,
the optimal allocation of defensive resources can be determined in
O(|Y | + n) time given the tips V = (V1, . . . ,Vn ).
Proof. Given the tipsV, the defender should calculate EGi (|Vi |,V0)
for each target i ∈ T , and then allocate the resources to r of the
targets with the highest EGi .
The above strategy is indeed optimal since the expected utility
with no resources is given by
∑
i ∈T EUui (|Vi |,V0), and once an ad-
ditional unit of resource is given, it should always be allocated to
the uncovered target that could lead to the largest increment in
expected utility, i.e., the target with the largest EGi (|Vi |,V0).
The calculation of EGi (|Vi |,V0) for each i ∈ T can be done in
O(n + |Y |) time, and finding the r largest EGi (|Vi |,V0) can be done
in O(n) time, leading to the overall complexity of O(|Y | + n). □
C PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2
Theorem 4.2. Computing the optimal set of informants to recruit
is NP-Hard.
Proof. Consider the case where r = 1, pv = wuv = 1 for all
u,v , and the targets are uniform i.e., Rdi ’s (R
a
i , P
d
i , P
a
i ) are the same
for all i ∈ T . We use the notation Rd (Pd ) instead of Rdi (Pdi ) for
simplicity. Let λ = 0.
To start with, we investigate how DefEU(U ) depends on a given
U . Since pv = 1 andwuv = 1 for all u ∈ X ,v ∈ Y , all attackers inV
will be reported to attack a location. Let random variable Xi = |Vi |
be the number of attackers who are reported to attack location i .
Since the targets are uniform, an attacker will attack each location
with probability qi = 1n if he goes attacking. Then the defender’s
expected utility DefEU(U ) could be written as
DefEU(U ) =
(
E
[
max
i ∈T Xi
]
+
|Y | − |V |
n
)
Rd
+
(
|V | − E
[
max
i ∈T Xi
]
+
n − 1
n
(|Y | − |V |)
)
Pd
=
(
E
[
max
i ∈T Xi
]
− |V |
n
) (
Rd − Pd
)
+
|Y |
n
Rd +
(n − 1)|Y |
n
Pd .
The latter two terms are independent of the choice of informants so
tomaximizeDefEU, it suffices themaximize
(
E [maxi ∈T Xi ] − |V |n
)
.
We can prove by induction on |V | that
(
E [maxi ∈T Xi ] − |V |n
)
increases as |V | increases, or E [maxi ∈T Xi ] increases by at least 1n
if |V | is increased by 1:
(1) Since E [maxi ∈T Xi ] = 1 when |V | = 1 and E [maxi ∈T Xi ] =
1 + 1n when |V | = 2, it holds for |V | = 1.
(2) Consider |V | ≥ 1 and the corresponding sequence {Xi }ni=1.
Let Xm = max1≤i≤n {Xi }. We add an attacker to V and
denote by p the probability of he targeting the location with
the largest Xi . Thus the expected maximum increase by p.
Since p ≥ 1n and by a simple coupling argument, we have
that E [maxi ∈T Xi ] increases by at least 1n .
Thus, in this case, solving for the optimal solution of the original
problem is equivalent to solving forU that maximizes the size of V
in the first stage.
We show that the optimization problem is NP-Hard using a
reduction fromMCP: we are given a number k and a collection of
sets S . The objective is to find a subset S ′ ⊆ S of sets such that |S ′ | ≤
k and the number of covered elements
⋃Si ∈S ′ Si  is maximized. Let
X = {x1, . . . ,x |S |}, Y =
⋃
Si ∈S Si , E = {(xi ,y) : i ∈ [|S |] ∧ y ∈ Si },
pv = 1 for all v ∈ Y andWe = 1 for all e ∈ E. Thus to find aU ⊆ X
with |U | ≤ k that maximizes the size ofV is equivalent to finding a
subset of sets with size no larger than k that maximizes the number
of covered elements in the instance ofMCP. □
D PROOF OF LEMMA 4.7
Lemma 4.7. Given the set of recruited informantsU , the defender’s
expected utility DefEU(U ) can be computed in polynomial time if
wuv = 1∀(u,v) ∈ E. When k is a constant, the optimal set of infor-
mants can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Sincewuv = 1 for all u,v , we have p˜v (V0) = 0 for each
v ∈ V \V0 given V0. Therefore, the expected gain of target j with y˜
reported attacks can be written as EGj = (y˜ +qj ∑v ∈Y \V pv )(Rdj −
Pdj ) and the calculation of f (·) depends only on the size of |V0 |. Thus,
instead of enumerating V0, we enumerate 0 ≤ t0 ≤ |V | as the size
of V0 in line 2 of Algorithm 1, and replace PV0 in Algorithm 1 with
Pt0 , where Pt0 = Pr[|V0 | = t0 |U ] can be obtained by expanding the
following polynomial
∏
v ∈V (1−pv +pvx) =
∑ |V |
i=0 Pix
i . Therefore,
DefEU(U ) can be calculated in O(n2r |Y |4) time.
Since all possibleU can be enumerated in O(|X |k ), the optimal
set of informants can be computed in O(|X |kn2r |Y |4). □
E ASISI
In Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5, we present the polynomial time
algorithm used to compute DefEU(U ) whenwuv = 1,∀(u,v) ∈ E.
F DEFENDER UTILITY IS NOT SUBMODULAR
We provide a counterexample that disproves the submodularity of
DefEU(U ).
Example F.1. Consider a network GS = (X ,Y ,E) where X =
{u1,u2}, Y = {v1,v2,v3}, E = {(u1,v2), (u2,v3)}, pv = 1∀v ∈ Y
and wuv = 1∀(u,v) ∈ E. There are 2 targets T = {1, 2}, where
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Algorithm 4 Calculate DefEU(U )
1: Expand polynomial
∏
v ∈V (1 − pv + pvx) =
∑ |V |
j=0 Pjx
j
2: EU← 0
3: for all possible number of reported attackers 0 ≤ t0 ≤ |V | do
4: if t0 = 0 then
5: EU = EU + Pt0
∑
v ∈Y pvDefEU0
6: Continue to line 2
7: for target i ∈ T and 0 ≤ ti ≤ t0 do ▷ Enumerate target i
and the number of attackers ti targeting i
8: Calculate f (·) given t0, i, ti
9: EGi ← (ti + qi ∑v ∈Y \V pv )(Rdi − Pdi )
10: EUui ← (ti + qi
∑
v ∈Y \V pv )Pdi
11: Pi,r ← (t0 − ti )!
(∑r−1
x=0 f (s,x , t0 − ti )
)
12: EU = EU + Pt0
(t0
ti
)
qtii · Pi,r · EGi
13: EU = EU + Pt0
(t0
ti
)
qtii (1 − qtii )EUui
14: DefEU(U ) ← EU
Algorithm 5 Calculate f (·) given t0,i ,ti
1: {i1, . . . , in−1} ← T \ {i}
2: EGi = (ti + qi ∑v ∈Y \V pv )(Rdi − Pdi )
3: Initialize f (s,x ,y) ← 0 for all s,x ,y
4: f (0, 0, 0) ← 1
5: for s ← 1 to n − 1 do
6: for x ← 0 to min(s, r ) do
7: for y ← 0 to t0 − ti do
8: for y˜ ← 0 to y do
9: EGis = (y˜ + qis
∑
v ∈Y \V pv )(Rdi − Pdi )
10: if EGis > EGi then
11: f (s,x ,y) ← f (s,x ,y)+q
y˜
is
y˜! f (s−1,x−1,y−y˜)
12: else
13: f (s,x ,y) ← f (s,x ,y) + q
y˜
is
y˜! f (s − 1,x ,y − y˜)
Rdi = i , P
d
i = −10−8 ≈ 0 for any i ∈ T . Letting λ = 0 yields qi = 0.5.
The defender has only 1 resource. We can see that DefEU(∅) =
DefEU({1}) = DefEU({2}) = 3, DefEU({1, 2}) = 14 (2+ 0.5)+ 14 (4+
1) + 12 (2 + 1) = 3.375. As a result, DefEU({1, 2}) + DefEU(∅) >
DefEU({1}) + DefEU({2}).
G PROOF OF LEMMA 4.3
Lemma 4.3. Assume that
∑
v ∈Y pv ≤ C ′ and |Pdi |, |Rdi | ≤ Q , the
error of estimation |DefEU(U ,C) −DefEU(U )| forC > C ′ is at most:
Q · e−2(C−C ′)2/ |Y |
(
C +
1
1 − e−4(C−C ′)/ |Y |
)
.
Proof. Let the random variableW be the number of attacks. Let
A1 be the set of events of having no less than C reported attackers
and A2 be the set of events of having no less than C attacks. Let
EA be the expected defender’s utility taken over all possible tips
given an event A. By noticing that A1 ⊆ A2, we have
|DefEU(U ) − DefEU(U ,C)|
≤
∑
A∈A1
Pr[A]|EA | ≤
∑
A∈A2
Pr[A]|EA |
≤ Q
|Y |∑
i=C
Pr[W = i] · i
= Q
©­«C Pr[W ≥ C] +
|Y |∑
i=C+1
Pr[W ≥ i]ª®¬
≤ Q ©­«Ce−2(C−C ′)2/ |Y | +
|Y |∑
i=C+1
e−2(i−C ′)2/ |Y |ª®¬ (6)
< Q · e−2(C−C ′)2/ |Y |
(
C +
1
1 − e−4(C−C ′)/ |Y |
)
. (7)
Inequality (6) follows by the Chernoff Bound, and inequality (7)
follows since
|Y |∑
i=C+1
e−2(i−C ′)2/ |Y |
≤ e−2(C+1−C ′)2/ |Y |
∑
i≥0
e−4i(C+1−C ′)/ |Y |
< e−2(C−C ′)2/ |Y | · 1
1 − e−4(C−C ′)/ |Y | .
□
H NON-CONVERGENCE OF THE LEVEL-κ
RESPONSE
Example H.1. Suppose there is a single attacker and two targets
with the following payoffs:
Ra1 = 0.6,R
a
2 = 0.8,
Pa1 = −0.8, Pa2 = −0.6.
In this case, there are only two possible tips: the attacker attacks
target 1 (V1), and the attacker attacks 2 (V2). Assume that only 1
informant is recruited with report probabilityw = 0.5. The defender
has only 1 defensive resource and uses the following strategy:
x0 = (0.5, 0.5), x(V1) = (1.0, 0.0), x(V2) = (0.0, 1.0).
When the attacker has λ = 2.9, the level-κ response will converge
to q = (0.4283, 0.5717). However, if λ = 3.0, then the process
will eventually oscillate between q = (0.2924, 0.7076) and q′ =
(0.5676, 0.4324) iteratively.
I PROOF OF LEMMA 5.6
Lemma 5.6. In the single attacker case, if there exists constant
L ∈ [0, 1), such that x¯i ≤ Lnλ(Rai −Pai ) for all i , then д(q) is L-Lipschitz
with respect to the L1-norm, i.e., д(q) is a contraction.
Proof. Given defender’s strategy x0 and x(V), define:
д(q) = QR(MS(x0, x, q)).
Then a level-(κ+1) attacker’s strategy can be computed by
qκ+1 = д(qκ ) = д(д(qκ−1)) = · · · = дκ (q).
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The convergence of level-κ is equivalent to the convergence of
дκ (q).
The marginal strategy xˆ can be written as:
xˆ(q) =
∑
V
Pr{V}x(V) = (1 −w)x0 +
∑
i
wqix(Vi ).
Notice that the function д(q) is just the quantal response against xˆ:
дi (q) = e
λuai (xˆi )∑
j e
λuaj (xˆ j )
,
where uai (xˆi ) is the attacker’s expected utility of attacking target i
when the defender’s marginal strategy is xˆ: uai (xˆi ) = Rai − xˆi (Rai −
Pai ). Therefore,
∂дi
∂qj
=
∂дi
∂uai
∂ual
∂qj
+
∑
l,i
∂дi
∂ual
∂ual
∂qj
=λwдi (1 − дi )(Pai − Rai )xi (Vj ) +
∑
l,i
λwдiдl (Ral − Pal )xk (Vj )
=λwдi
[
(Pai − Rai )xi (Vj ) +
∑
l
дl (Ral − Pal )xl (Vj )
]
.
Note that in the above equation, 0 ≤ w,дi ,дl ,xi (Vj ),xl (Vj ) ≤ 1,
Pai − Rai < 0 and Ral − Pal > 0. Thus we have:
λ(Pai − Rai )xi (Vi ) <
∂дi
∂qj
< λ
∑
l
дl (Ral − Pal )xl (Vj ). (8)
On the other hand, x¯i ≤ Lnλ(Rai −Pai ) meansxi (Vj ) ≤
L
nλ(Rai −Pai ) ,∀j .
Plugging into Equation (8), we get:
−L
n
<
∂дi
∂qj
<
L
n
∑
l
дl =
L
n
.
For any q′ , q, let q(i) = (q1, . . . ,qi ,q′i , . . . ,q′n ). So q(0) = q′ and
q(n) = q. Therefore,д(q) − д(q′)1 = n∑
i=1
дi (q) − дi (q′)
=
n∑
i=1
 n∑j=1
[
дi (q(j)) − дi (q(j−1))
] 
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
дi (q(j)) − дi (q(j−1))
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ qjq′j ∂дi (q)∂qj

q=(q1, ...,qi−1,s,q′i+1, ...,q′n )
ds

<
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ qj
q′j
L
n
ds ≤
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
L
n
|qj − q′j |
=
n∑
i=1
L
n
∥q − q′∥1 = L∥q − q′∥1.
□
J ALGORITHM FOR DEFENDING AGAINST
INFORMANT-AWARE ATTACKERS
Proposition J.1. The optimal objective of QRI is non-decreasing
inw .
Proof. Consider the two optimization problems induced by dif-
ferent values forw :w1,w2 wherew2 > w1. Let (x, y, z) be a solution
for whenw = w1. Then, (x, y, w1w2 z+ (1−
w1
w2 )x) is a feasible solution
for whenw = w2 that achieves the same objective value. To see why
it is feasible, observe that constraint (3) is satisfied by construction
and constraint (5) is satisfied since the new value for each zi is
a convex combination of the previous xi , zi , which were both in
[0, 1]. □
Proposition J.1 implies that when selecting informants, it is opti-
mal to simply maximizew . Sincew = 1 −∏u ∈U (1 −wu1), we can
select informants greedily and choose the k informants with the
largest information sharing intensitywu1. We can then solve the
optimization problem to find the optimal allocation of resources.
Finally, we discuss how to find an approximate solution to QRI
using a MILP approach.
We can compute the optimal defender strategy by adapting the
approach used in the PASAQ algorithm [26]. Let N (y),D(y) be
the numerator and denominator of the objective in QRI. As with
PASAQ, we binary search on the optimal value δ∗. We can check for
feasibility of a givenδ by rewriting the objective tominx,y,z δD(y)−
N (y) and checking if the optimal value is less than 0. To solve the
new optimization problem, which still has a non-linear objective
function, we adapt their approach of approximating the objective
function with linear constraints and write a MILP.
First, let θi = eλR
a
i , βi = λ(Rai − Pai ), and αi = Rdi − Pdi . We
rewrite the objective as∑
i ∈T
θi (δ − Pdi )e−βi (yi ) +
∑
i ∈T
θiαiyie
−βi (yi )
Figure 2: Utility comparison between the level-0 defender
and the informant-aware defender against an informant-
aware attacker.
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We have two non-linear functions that need approximation
f 1i (y) = e−βiy and f 2i (y) = ye−βiy . Let γi j be the slope for the
linear approximation of f 1i (y) from ( jK , f 1i ( jK )) to ( j+1K , f 1i ( j+1K ))
and similarly with µi j for f 2i (y).
The key change in our MILP compared to PASAQ is that we
replace the original defender resource constraint with constraints
(9) - (12), which take into account the ability of the defender to
respond to tips.
QRI-MILP:
min
x,y,z,a
∑
i ∈T
θi (δ − Pdi )(1 +
K∑
j=1
γi jyi j ) −
∑
i ∈T
θiαi
K∑
j=1
µi jyi j
subject to
K∑
j=1
yi j = (1 −w)xi +wzi , ∀i (9)∑
i ∈T
xi ≤ r (10)
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, ∀i (11)
0 ≤ zi ≤ 1, ∀i (12)
0 ≤ yi j ≤ 1
K
, ∀i, j = 1 . . .K (13)
ai j
1
K
≤ yi j , ∀i, j = 1 . . .K − 1 (14)
yi(j+1) ≤ ai j , ∀i, j = 1 . . .K − 1 (15)
ai j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j = 1 . . .K − 1 (16)
Proposition J.2. The feasible region for y = ⟨yi = ∑Kj=1 yi j , i ∈
T ⟩ of QRI-MILP is equivalent to that of QRI.
Proof. With the substitution yi =
∑K
j=1 yi j , constraints (9) -
(12) are directly translated from QRI. The remaining constraints
(13) - (16) can be shown to allow for any potential yi , represented
correctly with the appropriate yi j . □
With the above claim shown, the proof for the approximate
correctness of PASAQ applies here and we can show that we can
find an ε-optimal solution for arbitrarily small ε [26].
K ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In Figure 2, we compare the performance of the level-0 defender and
the informant-aware defender when playing against an informant-
aware attacker. We see that despite that their strategies are com-
puted under the level-0 attacker assumption, the utility of the level-0
defender is only slightly lower than the utility of the informant-
aware defender. For a fixed r , the difference in utility grows larger as
the defender recruits more informants and has a higher probability
of receiving a tip.
We test the special case assuming SISI. We set |X | = 6,k = 4,n =
10, r = 3 and enumerate |Y | from 2 to 16. The average runtime of
all algorithms including ASISI together with the relative error of
GSA and T-Sampling are shown in Figure 3. Though ASISI and
GSA are the fastest among all, the average relative errors of GSA
are slightly above 0%. T-Sampling is slightly slower than ASISI and
GSA, and the solutions are less accurate than the other two in this
case.
Figure 3: Runtime and Solution Quality increasing |Y | with
wuv = 1 for all u,v.
Figure 4: Error of DefEU on 2 Cases with Fixed C = 6,C ′ =
2, |Y | = 8,Q = 2.
Another experiment is a case study on 2 instanceswith
∑
v ∈Y pv <
2 fixed |X | = 6, |Y | = 8, n = 6, r = 3, Q = 2. We run EDPA, C-
Truncated (C = 6) and T-Sampling on each instance and show
the error of the estimations for allU ⊆ X . The results are shown in
Figure 4 and the red lines indicate the error bound given by Lemma
4.3. We encode the set of informants in binary, e.g., the set with code
19 = (010011)2 represents the set {u1,u2,u4}. The first instance is
constructed to show that the bound given by Lemma 4.3 is empiri-
cally tight, i.e., the estimation of DefEU(U ) by C-Truncated could
be large but still bounded. In this case, we set pv = 1,wuv = 1∀u,v ,
Rdi = Q and P
d
i = −10−3.While the other instance is randomly gen-
erated. It is shown that T-Sampling has larger errors with higher
variances compared to C-Truncated.
L EXPERIMENT SETUP
To generate GS = (X ,Y ,E), we first fix the sets X and Y . For each
u ∈ X , we sample the degree of u, du , uniformly from [|Y |] and
then sample a uniformly random subset of Y of size du . For each
(u,v) ∈ E,wuv is drawn fromU [0, 0.2]. For the attack probability
pv , in the general case, each pv is drawn from U [0.4, 1]. When we
restrict
∑
v ∈Y pv ≤ C ′, we draw a vector t = (t1, . . . , t |Y |) from
U [0, 1] |Y | and set pv = min{1,C ′ · tv| |t | |1 }. For the payoff matrix,
each Rdi (R
a
i ) is drawn fromU (0,Q] and each Pdi (Pai ) is drawn from
U [−Q, 0), where Q is set to 2. The precision parameter λ is set to
2. DefEU0 and qi ’s are obtained by a binary search with a convex
optimization as introduced in [26]. The number of samples T used
in T-Sampling is set to 100. In GSA, EDPA is used to calculate
DefEU(U ).
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In the QRI-MILP algorithm, the optimal defender strategy is
found with approximation parameter K = 10. The bi-level opti-
mization algorithm is implemented using MATLAB R2017a. The
low-level linear program is solved using the linprog function and
the high-level optimization is solved with the fmincon function.
M DEFENDING AGAINST LEVEL-κ
ATTACKERS
In the section 4, we deal with the case with only type-0 attackers
and provide algorithms to find the optimal set of informants to
recruit. In this section, we show how those approaches can be
easily extended to the case with level-κ attackers.
Once given xˆκ−1, qκ can be easily obtained. So as DefEUκ , the
defender’s expected utility using x0 against a single attack of a
level-κ attacker. To get the solution, we simply replace DefEU0, q0
with DefEUκ , qκ and apply Select or GSA. In order to calculate
xˆκ−1 by definition, all that remains is to calculateMS(x0, x, qi ) for
i < κ. The marginal probability of each target being covered can
be calculated in a way similar to EDPA.
